NATURE, NURTURE? HOW ABOUT BOTH?
THE HARTFORD COURANTJune 2, 2007
As
one who as co-authored articles in neuroscience, I was fascinated by
the front-page story on the brain's role in our abilities to empathize
and moralize [May 29, "We Can't Help But Do Good"]. But as one who has
also written about ethics, I worry that the philosophical conclusions
the article draws are hasty and flawed. Two of these conclusions merit
particular attention.
Because
"morality arises from basic brain activities," we're told, our values
are "not 'handed down' by philosophers and clergy, but 'handed up' [as]
an outgrowth of our brain's basic tendencies." But this ignores another,
equally scientific, fact: A child who is raised in chaotic, valueless
surroundings will, far more often than not, grow up to bear a
pathological lack of conscience.
For
this reason, it's best to view nature and nurture as partners, not
rivals, in crafting the adult moral faculties we take for granted.
Nature
indeed "hands up" a brain that is amazingly receptive to learning
values. But then it's necessary for the environment -- in the form of
conscientious parents and mentors -- to "hand down" the specific values
to that receptive brain. Otherwise, like a seeded field that lacks hands
to tend it, the brain's ethical potential will fail to achieve
fruition.
Another
"troubling question," according to the article, is that neuroscience
reduces "morality and immorality to brain chemistry -- rather than free
will," and that this "might diminish the importance of personal
responsibility."
A
little reflection shows why this is an overreaction. We've long known
that our capacity to use language is ingrained in various brain centers.
Does this mean that we use language robotically? Does it mean that I
have no choice over the words I'm writing now, or would lack
responsibility if my words were libelous? Clearly not. But if
brain-based language centers don't threaten our free use of language,
it's unclear why brain-based ethical centers should threaten free will,
either.
Beneath
both of these errors, I imagine, lies a more general worry: that if we
can scientifically explain our astonishing human abilities, then this
somehow makes those abilities less astonishing. I disagree. After all,
embryologists have come a long way toward describing how a zygote
becomes a full-term infant. Does that make childbirth any less of a
miracle? I think not.
Timothy Chambers
West Hartford
The writer teaches philosophy at the University of Hartford.
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